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The effects of noise on human beings are of interest to specialists across many academic disciplines
including medicine, economics, and psychology (Basner et al., 2015). In cognitive psychology,
people’s susceptibility to distraction by background sound/noise is often used as an instrument
to understand the nature of selective attention and short-term memory, and many theories have
been proposed to explain why people tend to perform better in silence compared with when there is
noise in the background (Hughes, 2014). For example, one explanation of noise effects that has been
offered is that noise captures attention. On this view, the reason why performance on a visual task
(e.g., proofreading) is impaired by background noise, is that the locus of attention is diverted away
from the target information (e.g., the visual text material) and is instead reallocated to the sound,
causing interruption to the task (Bell et al., 2012). A competing explanation is that similar processes
partake in the involuntary analysis of the background noise and the voluntary elaboration of the
task material, causing a conflict and performance decrements (Macken, 2014). A third explanation,
offered in the context of noise effects on complex cognition, such as that on reading comprehension
or word processed writing, is that noise impairs subcomponent abilities (e.g., working memory)
that is assumed to underpin the complex behavior (Jahncke et al., 2013).
In previous papers, I have tried to systematically discuss conceptual difficulties and lack of clarity
in the cognitive noise literature. The intention has been, specifically, to clarify issues concerning
explanation and interpretation of noise effects. In one paper, I discussed the conceptual problems
associated with the attempt to pinpoint the cognitive structure (or memory system) that is impaired
by background noise (Sörqvist, 2014). And in another paper, I discussed the problems associated
with the idea that the effects of noise on complex cognitive behavior (e.g., reading comprehension)
can be explained as an effect of noise on a sub-component of that complex behavior (Sörqvist, 2015).
Here, in the current paper, I will address another conceptual issue: That we sometime confuse the
definition of an effect with the explanation of that effect.
Definition vs. Explanation
In experimental psychology, an effect is the difference between two (or more) conditions. On this
view, an effect of noise is the difference between a noise condition and a control condition (typically
a silent condition). The well-known and extensively studied irrelevant sound effect, for example,
is hence the difference in performance on a serial short-term memory task between a sound
condition and a control condition. The definition of the effect is the difference on the dependent
variable between two (or more) levels on the independent variable. An explanation of an effect,
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in turn, is a theoretical assumption as to why the difference
between the conditions arises. It is very important to keep
the difference between definition and explanation in mind, in
particular when thinking about, and writing papers on, cognitive
noise effects. When they are not kept apart, an explanation
can easily become embedded into the definition, and that
leads to conceptual difficulties; difficulties that shroud the true
meaning of the effects, make theory testing troublesome and can
potentially constrain scientific progress.
I will address one concrete example from the literature to
make my point clear (i.e., that definition and explanation must
be held apart, otherwise theory testing is compromised). When
participants view a sequence of visually-presented items (e.g., k
l m v r q c) and later attempt to recall those items in order
of presentation, they perform better when the to-be-recalled
items are presented together with a task-irrelevant sound stream
with a single, repetitive sound element (e.g., d d d d d d d), in
comparison with a condition wherein the to-be-recalled items are
presented together with a sound stream with a deviant embedded
(e.g., d d d K d d d). This difference in performance between a
“steady state sound condition” and a “deviant sound condition” is
(the definition of) the deviation effect. A potential explanation of
this effect (i.e., a theoretical assumption as to why the difference
between the two conditions arises) is that the auditory deviant
(the “K” in the example above) captures attention, drawing
attention away from the to-be-recalled material, and thereby
causing a performance decrement.
It is not unusual that definition and explanation of effects—
like the deviation effect—are confused. For instance, the
definition of the deviation effect is sometimes offered as this:
“An auditory deviation effect occurs when attention is drawn
away from the primary task by an irrelevant but salient auditory
deviant” (Meinhardt-Injac et al., 2015, p.217). In cases such as
this, when the explanation is embedded in the definition, the
definition pre-specifies the explanation. On this view, the reason
why the deviation effect arises is because attention is drawn
away from the primary task by the salient sound. Other potential
explanations cannot be offered, since the explanation is a built-
in part of the definition. If, for example, interference between
similar processes is offered as an explanation for a noise effect
(e.g., as an explanation to why a difference in recall performance
have occurred between a “steady state sound condition” and
a “deviant sound condition”), that noise effect could not be
the deviation effect, because the deviation effect occurs when
attention is captured, nothing else. Such a view of the deviation
effect leads ultimately to circular reasoning.
Circularity
“Circularity” (or circular argumentation) is a tricky concept. The
following (hypothetical) conversation between two researchers
will serve as a clarifying example of circular argumentation:
- Individual differences in working memory capacity reflect
individual differences in attention abilities.
- How do you know?
- Well. Working memory capacity is related to performance on
the Stroop task, and the Stroop task is a measure of attention
abilities.
- How do you know that Stoop measures attention abilities?
- Because performance on the Stoop task depends on individual
differences in working memory capacity, and, as we know,
individual differences in working memory capacity reflect
individual differences in attention abilities.
This is an example of a circular argument, because there
is no independent evidence in favor of the basic premise—
that the Stroop task measures attention abilities—and therefore
the conclusion is self-reinforcing. Many influential theories in
cognitive psychology have been challenged for their circularity—
such as Craik and Lockhart’s levels-of-processing theory
(Baddeley, 1978), Lavie’s load theory (Benoni and Tsal, 2013) and
Baddeley’s phonological loopmodel (Jones et al., 2007)—but they
are still very influential, successful, and promote a substantial
amount of good research. The reasonwhy circularity is acceptable
to some degree is that circular theories may still propose the best
explanation from a probability viewpoint (Hahn and Oaksford,
2007).
Consider the following example as an illustration of a circular
argument from the noise literature: We know that serial recall
of a list of visually-presented items (e.g., “Monday, Saturday,
Thursday, Tuesday, . . . ”) is more impaired when the visual list
is studied in the presence of a changing-state sound sequence
(e.g., “k l m v r q c”) than in the presence of a steady-state
sound sequence (e.g., “m m m m m m m”). This is known as the
changing-state effect (Jones and Macken, 1993). The changing-
state effect does not arise when the task instructions are changed,
so that serial recall (i.e., reproduction of the visual sequence with
items reported back in the same order as they were presented)
is no longer required. When, for example, the task is to identify
the missing item from a closed set (e.g., the day of the week that
was not presented), a changing-state sound sequence is no more
disruptive than a steady-state sound sequence (Hughes, 2014).
A leading explanation for this is that the changing-state effect
only arises when the task requires serial rehearsal of the to-be-
recalled items. Based on this explanation, it may be tempting to
use the changing-state effect as an instrument to test whether
another task, say mental arithmetic, involves serial rehearsal, by
comparing the effects of a changing-state sound sequence with
the effects of a steady-state sound sequence onmental arithmetic.
If there is no difference between the two sound conditions, one
might feel inclined to conclude that mental arithmetic does not
require serial rehearsal. And similarly, if the changing-state effect
arises, one might be tempted to conclude that mental arithmetic
requires serial rehearsal. These conclusions/explanations are
circular. They could be the best explanations, if they were the
most probable, and they could even be correct, but they are still
circular without some additional evidence for the assumption
that the task—mental arithmetic—indeed involves (or does not
involve) serial rehearsal.
Even if circular arguments can be acceptable when embedded
into theories/explanations, the circularity that arises from
confusing the definition of an effect with the explanation of
that effect is never acceptable and should always be avoided.
It would be wrong to say that the changing-state effect is
an effect that takes place when the involuntary analysis of
acoustic variability in a sound stream comes into conflict
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with the serial rehearsal of to-be-recalled items. Conversely, it
would be right to say that the changing-state effect takes place
when a difference is found between a changing-state sound
condition and a steady-state sound condition, and the conflict
between the processes is the explanation of why that difference
arises.
Summary and Conclusion
The definition of an effect is the difference between two (or
more) conditions whilst an explanation is a theory about why
this difference arises. The definition and the explanation must
not be confused, and the definition should never include the
explanation. When the explanation of an effect is embedded
into the definition of the effect, the interpretation of the effect
is circular and conceptually weak. Some degrees of circularity
may be acceptable, because the explanation may still be the most
probable explanation, but not the circularity that is the result of
confusing definition and explanation. The problems discussed in
this paper can easily be avoided by always keeping in mind that
the definition of an effect and the explanation of that effect are
two different things.
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